Professor Giwoong Jung is a faculty member at the Center for International Area Studies of South Korea's Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and vice head of the HK+ National Strategies Research Project Agency.

The Nov. 3 summit between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung gave Türkiye-South Korea relations a clearer direction: joint production, technological cooperation, and shared opportunities. The two nations' friendship, rooted in the Korean War, remains indispensable. Koreans have never forgotten Türkiye's help during the war, and that memory provides a powerful foundation for solidarity. Recently, the K-wave and South Korean tourists in Türkiye have further strengthened bilateral bonds through mutual understanding. But the strongest tribute to that brotherhood is a partnership that delivers shared prosperity for the future.

Following President Lee’s visits to Ankara in November 2025 and July 2026, this latest summit offers an opportunity to advance their partnership in many areas. Both countries need reliable partners because geopolitical competition disrupts access to technology and supply chains. They have faced the twin dilemmas of alliance abandonment and entrapment and sought to maximize strategic independence. Both feel a legitimacy gap in the current international system: Türkiye argues that "the world is bigger than five," while South Korea demands more elected, representative, and accountable membership on the UN Security Council. Closer cooperation can broaden their options without requiring either to abandon existing alliances or adopt identical foreign policies.

Upgrading defense, trade, and tech

The summit combined industrial ambition with practical institutional steps. Four memorandums of understanding covered science, technology, and innovation; natural resources and mining; energy; and nuclear project financing. The leaders also supported broader defense cooperation and reaffirmed their commitment to more balanced trade. These outcomes matter, but implementation will determine whether they produce lasting change.

Defense offers the most immediate opportunity. Erdogan cited the Firtina howitzer and Altay tank as successful precedents. Lee identified joint manufacturing, technology collaboration, and entry into third-country markets as the next direction. This agenda goes beyond simply increasing purchases from each other.

Economic cooperation needs the same reciprocity. Updating the free trade agreement, as discussed in Seoul, should encourage investment and supplier integration rather than focusing exclusively on headline trade targets. South Korean manufacturers could qualify more Turkish suppliers and develop products jointly for regional markets. Electric-vehicle components and battery recycling offer practical opportunities to increase Turkish value-added production while strengthening South Korean supply-chain resilience.

The science and technology memorandum should support competitive joint research grants and university-industry laboratories. Industrial artificial intelligence, robotics, and power electronics provide realistic starting points. Funding engineers and smaller innovative firms would give the relationship a broader foundation than occasional agreements between major corporations.

Security cooperation requires mutual understanding, not identical policies. Seoul faces North Korea's nuclear and missile threat, while Ankara must manage insecurities around the Black Sea and the Middle East. Russia-North Korea military cooperation shows the connection between their security environments. Türkiye's reaffirmed support for Seoul's North Korea policy provides a basis for closer consultation, while South Korea can benefit from Ankara's regional knowledge. Non-proliferation, maritime security, and diplomatic de-escalation offer common ground without demanding automatic alignment on every dispute.

New avenues for regional diplomacy

Sustaining this agenda requires more frequent presidential meetings. Reciprocal visits are valuable, but progress need not depend on arranging another state occasion. The leaders could commit to an annual consultation on the sidelines of the G20 or UN General Assembly when appropriate and support it with regular ministerial reviews. A short meeting that resolves a financing or regulatory obstacle can be more useful than another expansive declaration.

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) offers another option. With its members' agreement, Türkiye could advocate inviting South Korea as a guest to an appropriate summit or cooperation event. This would create another opportunity for bilateral talks while connecting South Korean technology and investment with regional priorities. It can be presented as an invitation-based initiative rather than a step toward formal membership.

The South Korea-Central Asia Summit, first held in Seoul in September, offers a complementary C5+1 route. Seoul could consult its five Central Asian partners and the next host, Kazakhstan, about inviting Türkiye to a separate outreach event alongside their next summit. An associated leaders' meeting could explore transport connectivity, critical-mineral processing, and industrial cooperation. This would preserve the existing C5+1 framework without altering its core membership. Central Asian governments can shape the agenda as partners, not serve merely as a setting for South Korean-Turkish diplomacy.

These arrangements could support commercially credible projects along the trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, linking infrastructure with customs coordination and resilient supply chains. They should complement bilateral cooperation, not multiply institutions without purpose.

As diplomatic relations approach their 70th anniversary in 2027, the next task is clear: translate the Seoul commitments into concrete projects backed by firm deadlines and sustained political attention. More frequent meetings would not be an end in themselves. Their value lies in making cooperation more dependable, reciprocal, and capable of delivering results, and in turning brotherhood into shared prosperity.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.